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STRANGE ALLIANCE: AN AMERICAN, A NAZI, AND THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE

James J. Weingartner
Department of Historical Studies
Southern Illinois University Edwardsville
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Between December 21 and December 25, 1944, there occurred an encounter
between two officers, one American and the other German that is unique in the
history of World War II. The American was Major Hal D. McCown and the German,
SS-Obersturmbannführer Joachim Peiper. Passing notice of McCown’s account of
this encounter have often been included in narratives of the Battle of the Bulge,
but the fleeting relationship between these two officers is sufficiently
extraordinary as to warrant closer attention and broader contextualization than it
has heretofore received.
Of the two men, Peiper is by far the better known, due to his association with the
“Malmedy massacre,” the killing of 83 American POWs by troops of the
battlegroup under his command, and by reason of his mysterious death in 1976.
Kampfgruppe Peiper had been composed largely of troops of the 1st SS Panzer
Division “Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler.” That unit had been the outgrowth of the
Führer’s personal guard regiment, of which Peiper had been a member since 1936
following his graduation from SS-Junkerschule Braunschweig, one of the
academies established for the training of SS officers, and his completion of the
platoon leaders’ course at the SS training facility at Dachau. 1 Prior to World War
II, Peiper had become first adjutant to Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler, chief of
the organization that ran Nazi Germany’s network of concentration camps and
the chief executors of the Holocaust. In that capacity, he had accompanied
Himmler on tours of inspection and on one occasion had witnessed an early
experiment involving the fatal gassing of prisoners.2 The German invasion of
Poland saw Peiper assigned to Hitler’s military headquarters. He rejoined the
Leibstandarte in time to take part in the German attack on the Low Countries and
France in 1940, after which he returned to Himmler’s staff until August 1941,
witnessing the early stages of the Holocaust, before requesting to rejoin the
Leibstandarte fighting in Russia. Peiper remained with the Leibstandarte until the
end of the war as it evolved into a crack armored division, 1st SS Panzer, playing
major combat roles on both the Eastern and Western Fronts, in the course of
which he was much decorated for his combat leadership. But his dual identity as a
daring and ruthless combat commander and agent of a murderous ideology is
reflected in his continued close personal relationship with Himmler until the end
of the war. 3
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Peiper’s life and career have exercised a powerful attraction and have been the
subject of multiple biographies, as well as the inspiration for a stage play by a
Pulitzer Prize winning playwright. This is due in part to his personal notoriety, but
it is also the product of a personality that attracted the attention and even
admiration of many who came in contact with him. 4
Among these admirers was Major Hal D. McCown. An Arkansas native and a
graduate of Louisiana State University, as well as an honors cadet of its ROTC
program. McCown had entered the U.S. Army in 1940 and had landed in
Normandy on June 13, 1944, as a 28 year-old officer in the 30th Infantry Division’s
119th Infantry Regiment. Although in U.S. Army uniform for four years, McCown’s
combat experience began at that point and he readily admitted 43 years later to
having been “scared” and for good reason. His regiment was committed to the
brutal fighting in Normandy’s bocage country, which was ideal defensive terrain
for the skilled soldiers which McCown found the Germans to be. He remembered
it to have been “the toughest fighting of the war” for his regiment, and casualties
were heavy. 5
McCown had a narrow escape on July 25th as Lt. General Omar Bradley’s 1st
Army, of which the 30th Infantry Division was a part, launched Operation Cobra,
designed to break through the German lines containing the Allied beachhead and
free the mechanized forces concentrated there for rapid movement into the
French interior. As is well known, some of the bombs dropped by American
bombers in preparation for the attack fell short of German positions and caused
significant losses to US ground forces, including a three-star general and members
of the headquarters of the 119th Infantry Regiment, to which Major McCown was
assigned as operations officer. Shortly before the aerial assault, McCown had
providentially been called to the rear for a phone call and escaped the worst of
the bombing, although he remembered having been badly “bounced around” by
exploding bombs. Regimental headquarters, however, had been squarely hit, with
55 casualties. 6 But German lines were breached and US forces began to pour into
the French interior.
The 30th Infantry and 1st SS Panzer found themselves confronting one another
two weeks later. In a desperate attempt to stem the rapid advance of US troops
that threatened to roll up and destroy the whole of the German defenses in
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Normandy, Hitler ordered Operation Lüttich, an attack towards Avranches at the
base of the Cotentin peninsula to cut off the forces that had been freed by Cobra.
The now much-weakened 1st SS Panzer Division and McCown’s 30th Infantry
Division, which the fierce combat of the previous two months had reduced to 50%
of its original strength, were in the thick of the fighting around Mortain. In spite of
the fact that its tank force had been reduced to about a third of full strength,
McCown remembered the 1st SS Panzer as a “first class” division. 7
Nevertheless, success in Operation Lüttich, of which Ultra had given the U.S. Army
forewarning, was beyond German capabilities. Their defensive positions in
Normandy collapsed with heavy losses, and the survivors retreated eastward
towards the German border with US forces, including the 30th Infantry Division, in
pursuit. In recollections shared with veterans of the 119th Infantry Regiment long
after the war, McCown recalled that the 30th Infantry Division had met 1st SS
Panzer again in November in the fierce fighting around Aachen. Although the 30th
encountered surviving fragments of the division there, the Leibstandarte was
rebuilding 100 kilometers to the east in preparation for Hitler’s Ardennes
offensive.8 That bloody encounter would form the context for the brief but
fascinating interaction between Peiper and McCown.
The powerful armored battlegroup of about 5000 men under Peiper’s command
formed the spearhead of an attack aimed at Antwerp, which was launched on
December 16th, 1944. The U.S. 30th Infantry Division, also rebuilding, was rushed
south the next day to aid in blocking Peiper’s advance to capture vital crossings
over the Meuse River. Its 119th Infantry Regiment, whose 2nd Battalion was now
under McCown’s command, took up positions on December 18th east of the
Belgian town of Werbomont. While fighting over rough terrain between
Stoumont and La Gleize on the afternoon of December 21, McCown, along with
his operations sergeant and radio man, were captured by members of Peiper’s
force. 9
McCown was taken to the nearby village of La Gleize, where part of what
remained of Peiper’s battlegroup was nearly surrounded by 30th Infantry Division
troops and where its commander had established his headquarters as well as a
holding area for other American prisoners. McCown would remain Peiper’s
prisoner for about 90 hours before succeeding in returning to American lines.
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Following his escape, McCown wrote a report of his experiences which was made
an annex to the corps intelligence report under the title “Behind the German
Lines.”
Attached to the report is an introduction apparently written by an Allied
intelligence officer, probably British, which hints at its singular nature. 10
Literally thousands of (German) PWs have given their version of what goes
on within German units. Inevitably this is coloured [sic] by a large variety of
factors. PWs who give the most information are frequently those who are
browned off with their unit, their officers, and the war, and their accounts
reflect this feeling, often more subtly than is apparent. Others fall in the
familiar category of “anxious to please,” and tend to give what we want to
hear. Finally, PWs attempt to evaluate the whole company, the battalion,
the regiment, even the division with an actual knowledge of little more
than their own platoon. As a result, a really objective report is an unusual
occurrence.
The following account, written by an American battalion commander, who
was captured and later escaped, is such a case ….. 11
McCown’s claimed to have dictated his report within a few hours of his escape on
Christmas morning.
In La Gleize I was taken to the cellar containing the commander of the
German troops whose name I later found out was Lt. Col. Peiper….An
interpreter who had spent 16 years in Chicago, USA, served as interpreter. I
later found out that the majority of German officers spoke English fairly
well. The Colonel spent a few minutes trying to get tactical information
from me but seeing the attempt was worthless, sent me away again….
He was taken to another cellar, where a German lieutenant and several NCOs
made a further attempt to extract information.
All of the effects were there – I was placed in a chair…where the light of a
small electric bulb would fall on my face. One of the NCOs drew his Luger,
examined his clip, reloaded the weapon and laid it on the table in front of
him. It was with difficulty that I managed to suppress a smile at these
obviously studied and rehearsed preparations in a place so identical with
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what intelligence officers back in the States teach our troops to expect
when in the hands of the enemy.
His captors’ efforts to secure tactical information took place to the
accompaniment of artillery fire from surrounding U.S. forces that was reducing La
Gleize to rubble.
I was surprised to see that as my failure to respond to their threatenings
continued they grew no angrier but instead appeared to lose interest in the
procedure. Finally, I was taken to another cellar where a warrant officer
searched me thoroughly, taking my flashlight and knife but leaving me my
wrist watch, ring, a little food I was carrying and my personal papers.
McCown was then moved to yet another cellar, where he joined four captured
lieutenants of the 119h Infantry Regiment and exchanged information on their
precarious situation. 12
During the entire time I was in this town [La Gleize] I gathered all the
information I could from other captives as well as German officers and men
(who talked to a surprising degree) about the strength, disposition and
conditions of the Germans in that area. I did my best to determine the
objectives of this unit and gained from several sources among the German
officers and men that this division [sic] would be the first element in LIEGE
and MAASTRICHT. Colonel Peiper questioned me fruitlessly several times
about bridge conditions in the MAASTRICHT area. 13
This claim was probably more an effort on McCown’s part to distract attention
from having blundered into the clutches of the enemy while operating with his
new command and to refute possible accusations of fraternization with the
enemy to which later events might lend credence than a plausible description of
successful intelligence gathering by a cool and resourceful officer. McCown was
largely ignorant of the German language and his later claim to have been able to
understand much of his captors’ language thanks to his schoolboy’s knowledge of
Latin is patently ridiculous. Although he noted that most of the German officers
seemed to speak some English, it is unlikely that they would have done him the
courtesy of discussing their unit’s situation with him in his language. Much later,
he admitted that Peiper, who was fluent in English, had divulged “virtually no
hard intelligence.” 14
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McCown was amazed at the youth of the Germans he encountered. Most of the
enlisted men, he reported, were 18 or 19, many recently recruited but seemingly
well-trained. Captains and lieutenants ranged in age from 19 to 27. Equipment on
the whole was good, with the exception of some reconditioned half-tracks whose
state of repair was questionable. Morale was high, although food was in short
supply. Relations between officers and men was closer and friendlier than
McCown would have expected, and Peiper in particular distinguished himself in
this regard, visiting his wounded several times and often dispensing encouraging
words and comradely slaps on the back to his men. 15
This, too, must be read with some caution. Although morale and relations
between officers and men could have been readily observed as could a scarcity of
food, how did McCown ascertain the ages of German officers and enlisted men
and their state of training? It’s conceivable that Peiper revealed not only his own
age (29) but that of his officers to McCown in the course of their long and wideranging tĕte-à-tĕte on the evening of December 21-22. But how could McCown
have arrived at the conclusion that some half-tracks, the German SPWs or
Schützenpanzerwagen, were reconditioned? It is doubtful that Peiper’s men or
Peiper himself would have volunteered such information or that McCown had
been allowed to inspect the vehicles or could have detected evidence of
reconditioning of unfamiliar equipment if he had.
The most interesting interaction between McCown and Peiper was the
conversation that began on the evening of December 21. McCown was taken to
Peiper’s headquarters at around 11:00 p.m. for a meeting that continued until
5:00 a.m the next morning. McCown’s description of the six-hour conversation is
tantalizingly sparse. Peiper, he noted, seemed most interested in defending
Nazism and explaining why Germany was fighting. He professed confidence in
Germany’s ability to defeat the Allies with newly-raised divisions and
revolutionary weapons which, although inferior in quantity to Allied equipment,
would decisively best it in quality. How McCown responded to what was an
ardent profession of faith in the Third Reich and its Führer by a dedicated Nazi
was not addressed in his report. He may well have been reluctant to risk
antagonizing a man whom he suspected of complicity in the murder of American
POWs south of Malmédy several days earlier, of which he claimed to have
knowledge. The danger was real. At his trial, Peiper testified with brutal candor
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that he would have ordered his prisoners shot if he had been forced to fight to
the end in La Gleize “since I thought it was impossible that all of us would die here
and the next day a hundred and fifty [sic] Americans would get new weapons and
fight against the German Army. I could not take responsibility for that towards my
commanders” 16
Peiper was holding McCown and some 130 other American prisoners, most of
whom were members of the 119th Regiment’s 3rd Battalion who had been
captured earlier. In addition to his concern for their well- being, McCown may
have hoped that a talkative captor might divulge valuable intelligence which he
could carry back with him to US lines. And yet, there may have been still another
factor involved, implied by McCown’s summary assessment of Peiper included in
this section of his report: “I have met few men who impressed me in so short a
space of time as did this German officer,” with “straight well-shaped features ,
with remarkable facial resemblance to the actor, Ray Milland.” It is strange that
subjective judgements of this sort should have been included in an intelligence
report. Respect and perhaps even a degree of affection for his captor appear to
have developed (the Stockholm syndrome avant la lettre?). Thirty-two years
later, McCown speculated with obvious sympathy for his captor that Peiper’s
underlying motive for initiating their 6 hour meeting was simply that “he was
lonely.”17 Perhaps McCown, a product of early 20th century Arkansas and
Louisiana society, found aspects of Peiper’s ideological stance expressed in
articulate English, not entirely repugnant. Whatever the case, McCown’s high
regard for Peiper grew in the course of the events that followed.
Concerning treatment of prisoners by the SS, I can state that at no time
were the prisoners of this organization mistreated. Food was scarce, but it
was nearly as good as that used by the Germans themselves. The American
prisoners were always given cellar space to protect them from the
exceedingly heavy American artillery barrages. I was taken for a brief period
to the main prisoner enclosure which was a large two-room well constructed cellar quite superior to any I saw in La Gleize. The men were
considerably overcrowded….I organized the entire group of some 130 into
sections, appointed a First Sergeant and laid down a few rules concerning
rotation sleeping, urinating, equality and distribution of food and got the
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German warrant officer in charge of the prisoners settled upon a fairer
method of giving water to prisoners and providing ventilation. 18
Two direct hits on the cellar by American shells which McCown judged to be
105mm killed and wounded both prisoners and guards. These were later removed
by POWs who were apparently being held in another location and who told
McCown that German casualties from artillery fire had been heavy. The report
continues:
Late in the afternoon of 23 December I was called once more to Col.
Peiper’s headquarters. He told me that he had received orders from the
commanding general to give up his position and withdraw to the East to the
nearest German troops. He said he knew it to be impossible to save any of
his vehicles—that it would have to be a foot withdrawal. His immediate
concern was what to do with the American prisoners, of which he had
nearly 150, as well as his own wounded. He dictated to me a plan of
exchange whereby he would leave all American prisoners under the
command of the senior PW, a Captain, to be turned over to the American
commander as the Americans entered the town the next day.
Of course, MCown was in fact the senior POW, but he was to accompany the
retreating Germans, leaving Captain Bruce Crissinger in charge. The report
continues:
In exchange for the American prisoners, all German wounded would be
turned over to the 1st SS Panzer Division wherever they might be….I would
then be released to the American lines as I would be the only prisoner
retained during the foot movement of the Germans East from La Gleize.” I
told Col. Peiper that I could not give him any assurance that the exchange
would be carried out as it was a matter for higher headquarters. He said
that he fully understood…. 19
It is hard to accord much credibility to this scheme. Since Peiper was about to
evacuate La Gleize, his prisoners would be repatriated in any case as surrounding
US forces occupied the town. The only leverage Peiper had was his custody of
McCown. Permission to carry out such an exchange would probably have had to
come from higher authority – conceivably from Eisenhower himself. Would
recovery of a field-grade officer have been considered valuable enough to justify
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the release to the enemy of an uncertain but probably quite large number of their
personnel? It is likely that Peiper felt honor-bound to attempt to recover his
wounded, in spite of the improbability of success. The words Meine Ehre heisst
Treue ( My Honor is Loyalty) were embossed on every SS-man’s belt buckle. Or is
it possible that Peiper had another purpose in mind -- perhaps to counteract the
impact of the Malmédy massacre, news of which was by December 23 in wide
circulation, with evidence of his humane conduct? Whatever the case, McCown’s
account of Peiper’s escape from La Gleize is fascinating:
At 0300 24 December the foot column began to move. Col. Peiper and I
moved immediately behind the point, the remainder of his depleted
regiment following in single file. Col. Peiper told me he had 800 men to
evacuate. I later watched the column pass three separate times, and this
number was correct according to my own estimate….At 0500 hours we
heard the first tank blow up, and inside of thirty minutes the entire area
occupied by Col. Peiper’s command was a sea of fiercely burning vehicles,
the work of a small detachment he had left behind to complete the
destruction of all of his equipment….
Col. Peiper, his staff and myself with my two guards spent all day of the 24th
reconnoitering for a route to rejoin other German forces. No food was
available at any time after we left La Gleize; the only subsistence I received
was four small pieces of dried biscuit and two swallows of cognac which
one of the junior officers gave me. The German regimental surgeon gave
me one piece of Charms candy, the sugar of which did me lots of good
during the later long march. At 1700, just before dark, the column started
moving again on the selected route; we pushed down into a valley in single
column with a heavily armed point out ahead.
McCown was astounded by the column’s march discipline. It “was so perfect that
I could hardly believe that they could accomplish it….I believe we could have
passed within 200 yards of an outpost without detection.”
As the point neared the base of the hill I could hear quite clearly an
American voice call out ‘Halt! Who is there?’ The challenge was repeated
three times, then the American sentry fired three shots. A moment later,
the order came along the column to turn around and move back up the hill.
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The entire column was half way back up the hillside in a very few minutes.
A German passed by me limping. He was undoubtedly leading the point, as
he had just received a bullet through the leg. The colonel spoke briefly to
him but would not permit the medicos to put on a dressing; he fell in the
column and continued moving on without first aid. The point moved along
the side of the hill for a distance of a half mile, then again turned down into
the valley, this time passing undetected through the valley and the paved
road which ran along the base. Several American vehicles chopped the
column but at no time was its presence detected. The entire 800 men were
closed into the trees on the other side of the valley in an amazingly short
period of time.
McCown concluded that Peiper was reduced to trying to gauge the proximity and
location of German lines by the sound of the fall of American artillery fire on their
positions and that he was, in fact, lost. At around 10:00 p.m., Peiper, his executive
officer and operations officer disappeared and command of the column was
assumed by a young captain.
I tried in vain to find out where Col. Peiper went; one friendly enlisted man
of Col. Peiper’s headquarters told me that Col. Peiper was very tired and I
believe that he and a few selected members of his staff must have holed up
in some isolated house for food and rest—to be sent for from the main
body after they had located friendly forces.
The stamina of Peiper’s hard-pressed men continued to astound McCown.
Whereas Col. Peiper had given a rest ‘break’ every hour or so, there were
no ‘breaks’ given under the new command from that time until I escaped.
The country we were now passing through was the most rugged we had yet
encountered. All of the officers were continuously exhorting the men to
greater effort and to laugh at weakness. I was not carrying anything except
my canteen, which was empty, but I know from my own physical reaction
how tired the men with heavy weapons must have been. I heard repeated
again and again the warning that if any man fell behind the tail of the
column, he would be shot. I saw some men crawling on hands and knees. I
saw others who were wounded but were being supported by comrades up
the steep slopes; there were fully two dozen wounded in the column, the
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majority of whom were going along quite well by themselves. There was
one captain who was rather severely wounded, the colonel had told me,
who moved along supported by another officer and a medical NCO and was
still with the unit the last I saw of him.
It seemed evident to McCown that Peiper’s men were in desperate need of food
and rest. He claimed to have overheard conversation from his captors indicating
that a small village had been located that might serve for respite. Before the
column resumed its movement, the Germans’ luck in avoiding detection ran out.
…firing broke out not very far from where I was standing. My guards and I
hit the ground, tracer bullets flashed all around us, and we could hear the
machine gun bullets cutting the trees very close over us. The American unit,
which I later found out was a company, drove forward again to clear what it
obviously thought was a stray patrol, this time using mortar fire as well. The
mortar fire fell all around on the German position. I do not know if my
guards were injured or not—shrapnel cut the trees all around us….There
was considerable movement around me in the darkness. I lay still for some
time waiting for one of my guards to give me a command. After some time I
arose cautiously and began to move at right angles from the direction of
the American attack, watching carefully to my rear to see if anyone was
covering me or following me. After moving approximately 100 yards, I
turned and moved directly toward the direction from which the American
attack had come. I can remember that I whistled some American tune, but I
have forgotten which one it was. I had not gone over 200 yards before I
was challenged by an American outpost of the 82nd Airborne Division. 20
McCown had returned to American lines in time for a welcome Christmas dinner
with Major General Leland Hobbs, the 30th Infantry Division’s commander. 21 At
about the same time the German unit which had been his home for 90 hours had
succeeded in breaking through American lines and uniting with friendly forces.
Unlike McCown’s, Peiper’s report to his corps commander, SS-Gruppenführer
Hermann Priess, was delayed until the following morning. He claimed not to have
slept for the nine days of his battlegroup’s abortive advance and probably had
been able to function as a commander under prolonged and highly stressful
conditions with the assistance of Pervitin, the methamphetamine stimulant
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widely used by German forces. In any event, in addition to suffering from
exhaustion, he had been slightly wounded in the course of the withdrawal,
collapsed on his return to German lines, and was carried to an aid station under
the care of a regimental surgeon. 22
The war ended for both men 18 weeks later, for McCown in central Germany on
the Elbe, for Peiper in Austria, far from the man whose name the Leibstandarte
bore. Both would meet again under very different circumstances a year later in a
U.S. Army courtroom in Dachau, Germany—Peiper, as chief defendant in the
Malmédy Massacre trial and McCown, as star witness for the defense.
There was no realistic chance of acquittal for most if any of the 73 defendants.
The American public demanded vengeance and the evidence against them
seemed overwhelming. The prosecution team led by Lt. Col. Burton Ellis had
charged the defendants with the murders of far more than 83 U.S. prisoners near
Malmédy, Belgium. It claimed to be able to prove the murders of 538 to 749
prisoners of war and more than 90 Belgian civilians in numerous incidents during
Peiper’s December 1944 advance. Of these, 175 to 311 prisoners and 3 Belgian
civilians were alleged to have been slaughtered in La Gleize.23 But while the
prosecution was able to produce a few witnesses to some of the atrocities, the
most notable being Lieutenant Virgil P. Lary, one of the survivors of the Malmédy
massacre, the bulk of the incriminating evidence was in the form of sworn
statements from the defendants themselves, the circumstances surrounding the
securing of which would form the heart of the trial controversy.
The morally rigorous Brigadier General William K. Harrison had been assistant
commander of the 30th Infantry Division at the time of the Germans’ Ardennes
offensive. The Malmédy trial had begun on the morning of May 16th, 1946 and
was widely publicized in the United States. At the end of the month, Harrison sent
a letter to the office of the Adjutant General in Washington, D.C. In it, Harrison
noted that troops under his command had recaptured La Gleize on December 24,
1944, and had found no evidence of the murders alleged at trial by the
prosecution. Harrison bluntly declared his belief that the alleged La Gleize
murders were “figments of the imagination” and requested that his letter be
forwarded to Dachau “in order that no injustice be done.” 24
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Colonel John S. Guthries, an intelligence officer of Third Army who was following
news reports of the trial, recognized Peiper’s name as having figured in an
intelligence report he had seen and quickly identified McCown, then stationed at
Fort Benning, Georgia, as its author. His report was made available to Colonel
Willis Everett, leader of the defense team, who requested McCown’s presence as
a witness. Although he initially had reservations about testifying for the defense,
he was ordered by the Department of the Army to proceed to Germany, arriving
at Dachau on June 14, allowing ample time for Everett to confer with him prior to
his testimony on June 20th. 25
From the witness stand McCown outlined the circumstances of his capture and
the fact that he was able to ascertain that the American prisoners were being on
the whole well-treated and complained only of poor food and the theft of
watches and rings. When asked if he had observed any infractions of the Geneva
Convention, McCown again cited inadequate food and pilfering of personal
effects, but added that “inasmuch as we are guilty of the same…”. It was
immediately made clear that testimony regarding American infractions of the
laws of war would not be tolerated. The prosecution objected and the president
of the court ordered it stricken from the record. 26
McCown was then questioned specifically about the prosecution’s charge that
175 to 311 American prisoners had been murdered in La Gleize between
December 18th and 23rd, including a large number allegedly shot against a
cemetery wall adjacent to the only church in the village of 50 to 60 houses.
McCown replied that while he had not seen every street and corner, he had
moved around the town and past the church while under guard and had seen no
dead Americans beyond those killed by the American artillery fire which had
struck the cellar where they were being held. Had they been called as witnesses,
General Harrison and other members of the 30th Infantry Division who had
captured La Gleize would presumably have been able to reinforce McCown’s
testimony, as did several civilian residents including the village priest from whom
the defense submitted affidavits. 27
It seems likely that the alleged murders of American prisoners in La Gleize were
indeed “figments of the imagination.” 28 But the crime by which the trial is bestknown, the Malmédy massacre, was no fiction. The victims’ bodies had been
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found and identified and survivors had testified to the circumstances of the
slaughter, primarily by automatic weapons fire from some German vehicles
parked at a road junction south of Malmédy, where prisoners of Battery B of the
285th Field Artillery Observation Battalion had been assembled. Although there is
no convincing evidence that Peiper was present at the massacre site or had
ordered it he, like Japanese General Tomoyuki Yamashita who had been tried the
year before and hanged three months prior to the opening of the Malmédy trial
for atrocities committed in the Philippines, had held “command responsibility” for
this and other atrocities, both real and imagined. 29
Everett’s unwillingness to accept the court’s verdict and sentences was based
primarily on his conviction that many of the crucial sworn statements had been
extracted from the defendants by foul means. But there was more behind his
resistance. Although not a veteran of combat, he knew that American troops had
been guilty of similar offences and both McCown and Brigadier General Josiah
Dalbey, president of the court, appear to have reinforced that belief. Everett
claimed to have been told by McCown of his personal knowledge of hundreds of
German prisoners having been killed by U.S. troops; moreover, Everett recalled a
post-trial conversation with Dalbey in which the general declared that the
sentencing of the 73 defendants had been the most difficult assignment he had
ever undertaken because he knew that American soldiers had committed similar
crimes.30 Although a tu quoque defense was not permissible, Everett’s belief that
Peiper’s violations of the laws of war were no worse than those committed by
Americans and had gone unpunished strengthened his conviction that justice had
not been done in the Dachau courtroom. 31
Following his trial testimony and before his return to the United States, McCown
visited Peiper in his Dachau cell. He recalled 20 years later that Peiper had told
him of a phone call he had received from Hitler in the last days of the war,
informing him of his promotion to the rank of full colonel (SS Standartenführer)
when what remained of the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler was fighting a hopeless
battle against the Red Army in Austria. McCown’s visit and Peiper’s highly
personal revelation are further evidence of the strange relationship that had
developed between the two men during those 90 hours in LaGleize. It would have
repercussions for McCown.
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Thirty years after the trial, McCown recalled that the law member of the
Malmédy court, Colonel Abraham H. Rosenfeld, had conducted himself in a way
that he had found disturbing.
During my testimony, it became apparent that Colonel Rosenfeld was
under some sort of a mental stress. He subsequently became overly
emotional on several occasions. In at least two of these outbursts, the
President of the Court, a First Infantry Division Brigadier General,
admonished Colonel Rosenfeld in words which amounted to ‘calm down.’
Since I had no dealings with this officer either prior [to] or since my
testimony, I have no idea of what personal problems or misapprehensions
he may been laboring under. 32
Rosenfeld had been angered by what he regarded as McCown’s highly improper if
not outright treasonous conduct during the 90 hours as Peiper’s prisoner. Three
years later in the course of a U.S. Senate investigation of the Malmedy case, his
emotions were still raw.
I did not like McCown’s testimony. That wasn’t a question of a lawyer
sitting on a bench evaluating his testimony. That was a question of one
soldier who had been in combat evaluating another soldier who had been
in combat. I just didn’t like the manner in which he presented his
testimony, I didn’t like the manner in which he took the stand. I didn’t like
the manner, his manner on the stand, and no other member of the court—I
should say this—strike that—all the other members of the court agreed
with me unanimously. McCown—I don’t know; I don’t know whether
McCown was telling the truth or not. I can’t go behind it, but—and I am
glad to say this for the record—after 3 ½ years, I personally doubt the
veracity of his testimony….
Now, McCown and Peiper were entirely too friendly those nights they
spent together. Peiper, with 600 [sic] of his men, was able to escape the
trap when he was completely surrounded, and when he escaped McCown
was with him; and then McCown simply said—and I think I am stating the
exact words he said—it is in the record that, when they got to a certain
stage in their march out of La Gleize, McCown simply walked off and Peiper
went in another direction with his some 600 men.
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I have no faith—and I am glad to say at this time I didn’t have one bit of
faith in the testimony of the then Major McCown. 33
Rosenfeld’s highly emotional and semi-incoherent assessment of McCown’s
testimony was of little probative value, except perhaps to lend credence to the
belief held by the anti-Semitic Everett that the Dachau court had been hopelessly
biased against the defendants, a circumstance he believed that was largely the
work of Jews who were involved in the trial. But by that time, McCown’s
association with Peiper had undergone two additional analyses which differed in
many respects from McCown’s account.
One of them had preceded the trial by six months. On September 15, 1945, Peiper
had been interrogated by Captain Larry Vogel of the Counter Intelligence Corps in
regard to his interaction with McCown and the latter’s post-escape report. An
actual record of the interrogation appears not to have been made, but Vogel
submitted a report to Colonel William Philp, Commander of the European
Intelligence Service Center at Oberursel where Peiper was then being held, that
was potentially highly damaging to McCown:
During the massing of the American arty [artillery] on 23 December 1944
Maj McCount [sic] was able to estimate the progress of the American
preparations by the caliber of the shell used and the direction of the fire.
He predicted an Inf [infantry] attack by dawn the following day. When
Peiper confided to him that he intended to withdraw between 0300 and
0500 hrs, Maj McCount warned him that he could not expect to get out
after 0100 hours. The German withdrawal took place accordingly. Peiper
states that the Major’s predictions were fully confirmed by the ensuing
events.
Vogel reported that the conversation between McCown and Peiper was not
limited to military matters.
Maj McCount told Peiper that the Americans’ task was to pull British
chestnuts out of the fire, as the British preferred to let their allies do their
fighting for them. He expressed his regrets at the Russo-American alliance
against the German-Japanese combine. As he did not expect to return to
the American lines so soon, he offered his services to help fight the

18

Russians. He told Peiper that he could reciprocate by coming to America
after the war and help him hang the Jews. 34
Vogel’s report had been made available to the prosecution shortly after
McCown’s trial testimony and had probably been seen by Rosenfeld as well. It
was a report which “reflected against the integrity of Major McCown” and led to a
recommendation that Peiper be further interrogated to determine his and
McCown’s credibility. 35 The Malmédy investigation and trial would delay that
interrogation by more than a year.
On October 30, 1946 Peiper, now a prisoner in Landsberg Prison and wearing the
red jacket of those under sentence of death, was interrogated under oath in the
prison commandant’s office by Deputy Inspector General Colonel F.J. Pearson,
which led to a very different conclusion in regard to McCown and to Peiper
himself. In fluent English, Peiper offered his account of what followed McCown’s
capture on December 21, which differed in some interesting respects from the
American officer’s:
Q. Did you see him [McCown] later?
A. Yes, that evening. I was impressed by the attitude of this officer and,
after interrogating him about road conditions and troop movements in the
American rear, which he only answered with a smile. Later I had a long
conversation with him.
Q. Why did you stop interrogating this officer?
A. Because he would not give any information.
Q. Did this conversation you had later divulge any information about the
American plans?
A. No sir. My whole plan of operation was a desperate one and at that time
I already knew very well that I was fighting a losing fight and that I was
going to be encircled entirely; that there was only little hope to succeed in
my task and now it was my first opportunity to speak in a friendly manner
and, on a human basis, with an opponent. It was a big contrast to the cruel
and inhuman fighting style of the Eastern front and therefore I was very
glad to see that real front line soldiers speak the same language – and this
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feeling was the basis for our conversation. Here we were, sitting together in
a small cellar in a small village which was going to be blown to pieces by the
American artillery and any moment death might come and therefore we
both spoke in a very open manner about our feelings in a very sincere way.
Q. Was this officer held by you as a prisoner of war?
A. Yes, he was.
Q. Was he ever placed on parole?
A. Yes. During the early morning of the 24th, about an hour before leaving
La Gleize. We made a written agreement about the exchange of prisoners
and in which I wanted him to accompany me. I told him ‘Now Major, I
would like you to give me your word of honor you will not try to escape
during my break.’ His answer was ‘I do not think that fair.’ Therefore, I told
him the reason I would like it. I said, ‘I consider you a gentleman and
therefore I don’t want to give you a guard who will be with you all the time
with a machine pistol because during the night incidents are possible. I
want you to wear a white hat band around your helmet so you are visible
for all my men who will be informed that no one will have to take care of
you.’ I only wanted to prevent an incident during the night, and Major
McCown evidently understood for he gave me his word and wore the white
band. He accompanied me more as an attaché than a prisoner.
Q. Did you know when he escaped?
A. No. I found out later. I was wounded and, due to the fighting, I was
unable to keep track of Major McCown. Sometime later I asked for him and
was informed he couldn’t be found. 36
Colonel Pearson then turned his attention to the matter of Peiper’s interrogation
the previous year by Captain Vogel.
Q. I read you an extract from that interrogation. ‘Peiper states that during
Major McCount’s stay with the 1st Pz. Regt., 1SS Pz Div Adolph [sic] Hitler
he was not under guard as he had given his word not to escape.’
Apparently, from your previous statement to me, he was under guard for
some time; will you explain this?
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A. As I have told you previously, he was a prisoner under guard for some
time and later on the 24th he was placed on parole when he was
accompanying me with my retreating combat group.
Q. During the conversation you had with Major McCown…did he discuss
with you the artillery preparation?
A. No. We spoke of military matters. I told him something about the
German way of attack, using artillery support, and what I would do were I
in the American shoes. Then I spoke about my experience with American
artillery, about the value of American infantry and that I believed the Air
Force and artillery played the most important role, especially that of the
Americans. We spoke about American mortars and the very good American
communications, and of course he answered me about my opinions but
definitely without giving me any information or special information. It was
just the same as you have previously noted – the conversation of two
professional soldiers. The tenure [sic] of our conversation was that of two
foreigners, meeting at the Olympic Games. We exchanged addresses and
hoped we would meet again after this bloody war was over.
Q. Did Major McCown make any statement as to predicting the infantry
movements?
A. No, he did not. I would like to say here that I had more experience than
Major McCown and that I myself was able to recognize the signs of enemy
preparations and to decide by the increasing artillery fire the hour of the
expected American attack. I knew pretty well what was going to happen
and I spoke with Major McCown about these impressions….
Q. I will read you another statement you were reported to have made….’He
predicted an infantry attack at dawn of the following day. When Peiper
confided to him that he intended to withdraw between 0300 and 0500
hours, Major McCown warned him that he could not expect to get out after
0100 hours. The German withdrawal took place accordingly. Peiper states
that the Major’s predictions were fully confirmed by the ensuing events.’ Is
that correct?
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A. He didn’t make such statements. The statement you have just read to
me is incorrect. They are words put in my mouth and Major McCown did
not make any such statements. I told Major McCown that I was going to try
a break early in the morning. He asked me when. I said, ‘I don’t know for
sure but about 0200 or 0300, maybe later, because all the time I played the
‘strong man’ before Major McCown because I didn’t want to show him, at
any time, how desperate the situation really was….Major McCown did not
know I was going to make the break on foot. I recall he was under the
impression I was going to break with all my vehicles as he said, ‘I’m very
glad to have the opportunity to ride in a German tank.’ When I told him I
would try this break at 0200 or 0300 he did say ‘don’t you think it will be
too late?’ The artillery fire was so intense that any experienced soldier
would have easily recognized the attack would come early in the morning.
Please remember, Colonel, that Major McCown was with me for three days
and I felt I knew more about the disposition of the American troops than he
did at that time. 37
Q. I read you another extract from your previous interrogation. ‘Major
McCown told Peiper that America’s task in this war was to pull British
chestnuts out of the fire, as the British preferred to let the Allies do their
fighting for them.’ What can you say on that?
A. I commented to Major McCown that I felt the British were not willing to
waste their blood and he said ‘Yes, that may be.’ He may have made the
statements about the chestnuts, I can’t recall.
Q. I read you another extract. ‘He expressed his regrets at the RussoAmerican alliance against the German-Japanese combine. As he did not
expect to return to the American lines so soon, he offered his services to
help fight the Russians.’ Have you any comment on that?
A. I cannot recall the statement as you quote it. I told him it was a pity our
ally is Japan and yours is the Russians and he said he had the same feeling.
May I say that this conversation was more along the line of a joke as we
were trying to keep our spirits up. I recall he said, ‘Well, I guess the war is
over on this front for me, so I’ll help you fight the Russians.’ Again I say, this
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was all in a joking manner and I never took him seriously. This was more to
keep our spirits up.
Q. I read you another extract. ‘He told Peiper that he could reciprocate by
coming to America after the war and help him hang the Jews.’ Can you
recall any such statement?
A. I can’t recall the details. We had a long conversation about the Jews. He
was interested to learn something about the German situation … and my
personal opinion of Hitler. He wanted to know why we persecuted the Jews
and so I tried to explain to him the Jewish situation in Germany, how it
came about. I told him we see America only through the eyes of
propaganda and you do the same about Germany. I was interested to learn
where the Jews played such an important role in the States as we were
taught. I asked him if all influential positions in the States were held by the
Jewish people. He told me something about the strong financial interest
they had and I believe I said, ‘OK, when this war is over, I’ll pay back your
support against the Russians and help you hang the Jews.’ These remarks
were also made in a joking manner. 38
Q. You have mentioned that ‘words were put in your mouth’ by the former
interrogator and have denied several of the statements attributed to you.
Can you tell me how you were interrogated and under what conditions?
A. Yes, I will be glad to. I was not sworn and, from the very beginning, I had
the impression the interrogator was not sincere. That he told me wrong
things to get me in an excited mood and condition because he saw that I
was not willing to speak anything against Major McCown, and therefore he
gave me many statements of Major McCown against me to bring me in a
bad mood. I was not shown the statement I made. He did not record
everything I said as you do – he only made a few notes on which he must
have elaborated later.
Q. Do you hold any personal grievances against Major McCown?
A. No, Sir. I consider him to be an honorable officer and a gentleman and
consider it fortunate that during this bloody war I was able to make his
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acquaintance. As I have already told you, I was impressed by his attitude –
therefore I treated him not so much as an enemy but in a friendly manner.
Q. I will now read you a statement made by Major McCown of his contact
with you. (The entire statement of Major McCown was read). Have you any
comments on this?
A. That statement is basically correct. I cannot say about his escape for I
was not there.
Q. In his statement Major McCown stated that you did not destroy all
vehicles [sic]. Is that correct?
A. I did leave a few vehicles behind me that I did not destroy as they were
adjacent to buildings in which I knew there were wounded, and had I blown
these vehicles up, it would have damaged the buildings and possibly killed
many of the wounded….
Q. Did anything Major McCown said influence you in any way I making
your tactical decisions?
A. Definitely not. I considered I was better qualified professionally to make
my own decisions….
Q. Have you anything more to say that will assist in this investigation?
A. Nothing more than I have been misquoted and that I consider Major
McCown absolutely an honorable man and certainly one who conducted
himself while in my hands with dignity and as a good soldier. 39
As had McCown, Pearson reacted positively to his encounter with Peiper, finding
that “his attitude during the entire interview was courteous, dignified and
sincere.” The acts attributed to him in McCown’s report, he concluded, “hardly
identify PW Joachim Peiper as an individual capable of committing the crime
attributed to him in the Malmédy incident. In fairness to the prisoner, and my
own conscience,” he concluded, “I feel that this report should be submitted, to be
considered in the review of this case.” 40
The purpose of the “interview,” of course, was not to judge the fairness of
Peiper’s conviction, but to ascertain whether McCown had given him militarily
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valuable information. Peiper had denied it, but could he be trusted? Pearson
declared himself
…convinced that the answers given to the questions submitted to him are
sincere. The man has nothing to lose, being condemned to death and
waiting day by day for his execution. The conversation held between the
two officers was perfectly natural in their discussions of comparison [sic]
tactics and, as Colonel Peiper said, ‘I was acting the ‘strong man’ and was
trying to avoid letting Major McCown know the tight spot I was in.’ A case
of bluff and pride. 41
The investigation of the strange wartime association between a U.S. Army major
and an Obersturmbannführer (lieutenant colonel) of the Waffen-SS was to all
intents terminated with a recommendation from Colonel Rosser L. Hunter, Chief
of the Inspector General’s Investigation Group, to the Adjutant General in
Washington, D.C.
In view of the sworn statements of Lt. Col. Peiper concerning the conduct
of Lt. Col. McCown while the latter was a prisoner of the former, it is the
opinion of this office, after careful consideration of this case, that further
investigation of this matter…would be fruitless and uneconomical. While it
appears that Lt. Col. McCown was unusually friendly and cooperative with
an enemy on the instant occasion, there is insufficient evidence to warrant
disciplinary action in connection therewith. It is not reasonable to assume
that Lt. Col. McCown would furnish the necessary evidence and it appears
that the true relationship between him and Lt. Col. Peiper during the period
concerned is a matter known only to those two individuals. 42
While Peiper could have been motivated by a sincere desire to protect an officer
who had been willing to jeopardize his career by testifying for the defense in the
Malmédy trial, even more important may have been the opportunity to portray
himself as a purely professional soldier, thus obscuring his association with
Himmler’s SS and its genocidal crimes. In this effort, he enjoyed the cooperation
not only of Hal McCown, but of other officers of the U.S. Army who probed the
relationship between the two men. Nowhere in the text of the documents
generated by McCown’s captivity and the investigation thereof is the Waffen- SS
mentioned. Peiper is identified as “Lt. Colonel,” never by his SS ranks of SS-
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Obersturmbannführer or SS-Standartenführer, equivalent to Colonel, his rank at
the end of the war. This may have been due simply to the U.S. Army’s
unfamiliarity with Nazi terminology, but sympathy rather than ignorance is
suggested by Peiper’s interrogation at the hands of Colonel Pearson. In the
introduction to Pearson’s report, Peiper is identified as “a former officer of the
German Army” and is asked at the start of the interrogation, “Were you a
member of the Germany Army in December 1944?” “I was”, he answered.
Peiper’s image as nothing more than a professional soldier might have suffered if
McCown and Pearson had been privy to a letter he had written a few months
earlier following the conclusion of the Malmedy trial and his own sentence of
death. In melodramatic reminiscing about his wartime experiences that dripped
with devotion to the Nazi cause, he observed,
I fought and bled in all European theaters and became a preferred favorite
of the god of hosts. In spite of all, it was a proud and heroic time! Where
we were standing was Germany and as far as my tank gun reached was my
kingdom! We had no personal aspirations. Our vision has always been the
‘Dream of Reich.’ In the end of war [sic], when the Führer was needing his
Leibstandarte the most…fate had separated us from him…. 43
History remembers Peiper’s “dream” as a nightmare.

Peiper and McCown are long dead. Their postwar lives followed very different
courses. McCown made the U.S Army his career, and there is no evidence that his
questionable association with Peiper worked to his disadvantage. Shortly after his
escape, he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and was awarded the
Silver Star, the U.S. military’s third highest award for valor. He served as
commander of the 17th Infantry Regiment during the Korean War and later
commanded in three major assignments in Vietnam and Thailand, including as
Commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, prior to retiring to his
home state of Arkansas with the rank of Major General in 1972. 44
Post-war reflection had not significantly changed his assessment of Peiper. In
1976, he wrote that
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My attitude towards Peiper was initially one of apprehension. I early
learned Peiper had 135 US POWs, and I was concerned for their safety and
well-being as the senior officer present. The news of the Malmédy
Massacre had crossed the front the previous day and I believed it possible
that the unit that had captured me might have been involved. When Peiper
by both words and actions lived up to the Geneva Rules as well as his own
surrounded and supply-deficient position would permit, my respect for him
increased and my apprehensions over prisoner safety were considerably
allayed. My overall impression of him after my period of capture was that
he appeared to be a highly competent professional soldier emotionally
balanced in all contacts I had with him, showed an occasional sense of
humor and was reasonably responsive to all requests I made of him
concerning U.S. prisoners of war. 45
In 1987, McCown was invited to address a reunion of veterans of the 119th
Infantry Regiment’s E Company. His address took the form of his recollections of
the regiment’s experiences following the 30th Infantry Division’s June 1944
combat debut in Normandy. He elected to say nothing about his 90 hours as
Peiper’s prisoner beyond noting that he had gotten only one decent meal, which
seemed to suggest mistreatment by his captors. In the original description of his
captivity, however, he had stated that he and his fellow POWs had eaten almost
as well (or as poorly) as the Germans themselves. McCown may have doubted
that recollections of his comradely interaction with the man widely regarded as
responsible for the Malmédy massacre and his chivalrous treatment by his
command would be well-received by the assembled veterans.46
But McCown’s admiration for the battlefield prowess of the Waffen-SS is evident
and not only in the context of his description of combat operations. Following the
end of the war in Europe, the 119th Infantry Regiment found itself billeted in a
dismal French town. Nearby was the resort of Deauville, with its luxurious hotels,
casinos, and beautiful beaches but, alas, it was reserved for high-ranking officers.
McCown proudly described how he had persuaded the Major in charge of
billeting to open Deauville to the 119th by proudly pointing out that, not only had
European Theater historian S.L.A. Marshall ranked the 30th Infantry Division as the
premier U.S. infantry division in Europe, but that it had allegedly earned the
reputation of being “Roosevelt’s SS.” McCown was referring to a broadcast
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supposedly made during the Battle of the Bulge by “Axis Sally,” the American
Mildred Gillars, who was working for the Germans as a radio propagandist. She
was quoted as declaring that “The fanatical 30th Division, Roosevelt’s SS, are en
route to rescue their First Army, but this time it will be annihilated.” McCown’s
evident pride in that designation had apparently been shared by other members
of the division. The U.S. Army newspaper Stars and Stripes reported on January 7,
1945, that
The boys rather fancied the idea. They pointed out that they really were
Elite Troops, a chosen few and top-notch fighters. Major E.L. Glaser of Palm
Beach, Fla. decided to adopt the designation and make a new division patch
to go with it. The result was a design, now under consideration at division
headquarters, which combines the O and the H of the 30th’s Old Hickory,
with the two flashes of lightning which comprise the SS troopers’ insignia
and to top it off with the President’s well-known initials.
Permission for the alteration was never granted, although some of the 30th’s GIs
allegedly improvised their own SS patches. 47 Had he known of it, Peiper who, like
other Germans, tended to attribute the successes of U.S. Army ground forces to
the overwhelming superiority of American air power and artillery, would probably
not have been pleased.
For Peiper, death came on a very personal battlefield 31 years after the war’s end.
His death sentence had been commuted to life imprisonment in 1951. Shortly
before Christmas 1956, he was released on parole from Landsberg prison. The
story of his struggle to reintegrate himself into a German society very different
from the one he had known and his death at the hands of French arsonists at his
residence in the tiny village of Traves sur Saŏne in the early morning hours of
Bastille Day, 1976, need not be repeated here.48 Suffice it to say that he could not
escape the notoriety that pursued him to his death.
As McCown remembered him with admiration, so too did Peiper remember
McCown. Immediately following his conviction and convinced that some of his
men had testified against him to save their own skins, he wrote to Everett that “In
time of deepest human disappointments, you and McCown have returned to me
much faith I already had lost….” 49 In his 1946 interrogation by Colonel Pearson,
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Peiper had characterized McCown as “an honorable officer and a gentleman.” By
1971, 15 years after his release, some of the gloss on Peiper’s assessment of
McCown had faded. McCown’s account of his interaction with Peiper, he claimed,
was characterized by self-justification and embellishment, as to some degree it
undoubtedly was. Did McCown’s description of their conversations in La Gleize
now embarrass him, as McCown may have judged praise for Peiper best forgotten
in 1987? In any event, Peiper’s esteem for McCown was understandably
overshadowed by that for Everett, to whom he probably owed his life. At the time
of his death, Peiper was gathering material for a book on his experiences of the
Malmédy incident and its aftermath, which he planned to dedicate to Everett and
in which McCown would likely have figured. 50
McCown and Peiper interacted with one another over a period of 90 hours. The
evidence on which their mutual judgements were based was necessarily
extremely limited. Each man attempted to use the other as a source of military
intelligence, while Peiper saw in McCown a means of recovering his wounded. For
his part, McCown cooperated with Peiper in an effort to insure the well-being of a
large number of American prisoners of war.
Both men claimed to have found respect for one another as professional soldiers,
but how similar in fact had their “professional” experiences been? While McCown
had been an LSU upperclassman, ROTC cadet, and junior officer in a U.S. Army
preparing for war, Peiper had been serving on Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler’s
staff, where he was witness to the early stages of the Holocaust and frequently in
Adolf Hitler’s company. Although both were approximately the same age, in
terms of pure combat experience, McCown was a neophyte compared to his
captor. At the time of his capture, McCown had been in a combat zone for about
six months. Peiper’s career as a combat officer had begun briefly in France in the
spring of 1940, but most of his battle experience had been gained in Russia
following his reassignment by his own request in August 1941. The kind of war
that Peiper had waged in that eastern vastness was far different from anything
McCown had experienced and possibly could imagine. There, Nazi Germany and
Peiper had waged a war of annihilation against both combatants and civilians
justified by a racist ideology that regarded the Slav as Untermensch or
“subhuman.” In Russia, anything remotely similar to those ninety hours in La
Gleize would have been unthinkable. Peiper was a complex and selectively
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sensitive personality and may have found in McCown a therapeutic opportunity
after the dehumanizing horrors of the Eastern Front to interact with the enemy as
human being, particularly in light of his by then clearly failed military mission.
McCown’s statement that he had seldom met anyone who had impressed him as
much as Peiper had cries out for analysis. In fact, most Americans who came into
contact with Peiper in the course of his captivity and trial as well as later were
impressed by him. He was good-looking, intelligent, well- read, and expressed
himself in articulate English. McCown noted that he showed a sense of humor in
spite of being surrounded by American forces and in a near hopeless position. He
seemed, in short, a “cool customer.” He had already come to admire the
formidable fighting qualities of German soldiers and had assessed Peiper’s
division, the 1st SS Panzer, as a first-class armored unit. McCown may well have
been primed to hold in high regard one of its officers whose battlefield
experience greatly exceeded his own, particularly one who proved himself willing
to observe the rules of war, at least in regard to the American prisoners he held in
La Gleize. Those are qualities that McCown esteemed, but might there have been
more?
McCown had reported little about any exchanges not directly related to the
current military situation, but Peiper had been more forthcoming. In his
September 1945 interrogation by Captain Vogel, he had allegedly stated that
McCown had offered to help Germany fight the Russians if, in return, Peiper
would come to America after the war to help him hang Jews. When queried about
this by Colonel Pearson, Peiper confirmed the exchange, but brushed it off as a
joke. It was of course a “joke” but one that hinted at a horrifying reality. Could it
have reflected a degree of attitudinal affinity on race between a committed Nazi
and an officer in an army that was no stranger to antisemitism? Unfortunately,
McCown was not interrogated by U.S. Army authorities in regard to his
association with Peiper while his prisoner. It is likely that the report he submitted
immediately after his return to American lines on December 24, 1944 did not tell
the whole story.
There is of course a deep divide between the anti-Jewish prejudice common at
that time in the United States and in its army and the murderous anti-Semitism
that was at the heart of the Nazi Weltanschauung with which Peiper was
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thoroughly familiar and to which he subscribed. 51 Himmler intended the WaffenSS to be a force of “political soldiers,” by which he meant militarily trained men
indoctrinated with and motivated by Nazi racism combined with Härte (hardness
or harshness) of which Reinhard Heydrich, chief of the Reich Security Main Office
and one of main organizers of the Holocaust, was considered the ideal
embodiment. 52 SS educational guides, the SS-Leithefte, provide useful insights
into the content of this indoctrination. “Where unlike meet, hatred holds sway, …
Here God wants no love”, read a poem that was offered to the SS reader in
1942.53 A wartime article entitled “Du oder ich” (“You or Me”) informed the SS
man that as long as he was fighting for victory, he was also fighting for right and
justice. Harshness in combat was holy while mercy was unacceptable.54 A letter
purportedly written by a young Waffen-SS officer shortly before his death on the
Eastern Front, described orders received and carried out to shoot Russian
prisoners, observing that “we have learned to be fearfully harsh when it serves a
purpose.” 55 A January 1943 Leitheft contains a chilling manifesto: “The SS is hard
as steel, a community committed to death….We have a right to be hard on others
because we have been hard on ourselves.” In a speech delivered to high-ranking
SS officers in November 1938, Himmler declared that in war, an SS man was never
to surrender to the enemy and was under no obligation to take prisoners.56
American soldiers could be “fearfully harsh,” too, as McCown knew. His own
capture, ironically, had resulted in an order to his battalion to take no prisoners,
based on the assumption that Peiper’s men would shoot its commander. 57
Historian Stephen Ambrose notes that out of the more than 1000 American
veterans of the World War II European Theater whom he interviewed, one third
reported having witnessed German prisoners with their hands raised being shot.58
But SS culture with its sanctification of killing and years of unrestrained savagery
in Russia where racist Härte had been given free rein undoubtedly increased the
frequency with which the laws of war were violated in the West by Waffen-SS
units.
In a wartime speech, Himmler observed that “…we must be honorable, decent,
loyal and comradely to bearers of our own blood, but to no one else.” 59 SS
literature defined most Americans, unlike Russians, as racial equals, although
corrupted by crass (and largely Jewish) materialism.60 Peiper’s ideological milieu,
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therefore, could accept both the purposeful and “fearfully harsh” murder of
prisoners of war and the chivalrous treatment of a U.S. Army major.
While together in La Gleize, Peiper and McCown briefly traded the status of
enemy for that of quasi-ally and possibly “soul-mate”. Whatever might have
motivated them, those 90 hours spent in a Belgian village on the eve of Christmas
1944 expand our perspective on the range of human responses to the hellish
stresses of combat. They also provide evidence that war, like politics, can produce
strange bed-fellows.
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